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Abstract 
There is not general consensus about if women are more or less generous than men. Although 
the number of papers supporting more generous females is a bit larger than the opposed it is 
not possible to establish any definitive and systematic gender bias. This paper provides new 
evidence on this topic using a unique experimental dataset. We used data from a field 
experiment conducted under identical conditions (and monetary payoffs) in 6 Latin American 
cities, Bogotá, Buenos Aires, Caracas, Lima, Montevideo and San José. Our dataset amounted 
to 3,107 experimental subjects who played the Trust Game. We will analyze the determinants 
of behavior of second movers, that is, what determines reciprocal generosity. 
In sharp contrast to previous papers we found that males are more generous than females. In 
the light of this result, we carried out a systematic analysis of individual features (income, 
education, age, etc.) for females and males separately. We found differential motivations for 
women and men. Third, we see that (individual) education enhances pro-social behavior. 
Lastly, we see that subjects’ expectations are crucial. 
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1) Motivation  
Reciprocity plays a central role in daily life. In a whole range of contexts from markets to intra‐









individuals  who  receive  more  are  more  likely  to  give  more  in  return,  that  is,  generosity 
























3  Chaudhuri  and  Gangadharan  (2003)  also  elicited  expectations  for  TG  players.  However  they  focused  on  first 
movers: the amount of returned money they expect from second movers. We concentrated on second mover 
expectations.   3














In  a  recent  paper,  Cox  and  Deck  (2006)  state  that  social  distance  is  important  in  gender 
behavior, as are social cost and monetary costs. They found that women are more responsive 













































During  the  study  that  generated  the  data  set  (IADB,  2007)  a  representative  sample  of 
individuals  from  heterogeneous  urban  societies  in  six  Latin  American  capital  cities  were 
recruited in the streets and invited to participate voluntarily in a set of economic experiments, 
and  they  were  offered  immediate  substantial  economic  incentives  to  participate.  In  each 
session there were around twenty people who did not know each other. The interactions 






























































met  in  one  room  where  they  could  see  each  other,  but  they  were  not  allowed  to 
communicate. During the session they received information about the other participants in 
that particular group, depending on the specific activity. 
Our  project  was  based  on  experiments  and  surveys  conducted  in  6  Latin  American  cities: 

























  Bogotá  B. Aires Caracas Lima Montevideo San José  Total
N (participants)  567  498  488  541  580  435  3109 


































































































































































































Remember  that  the  game  was  played  once,  so  there  was  no  chance  for  player  1  to 
subsequently retaliate against player 2. 






pool  was  not  restricted  to  students  (of  similar  ages  and  family  backgrounds)  but  is  more 
heterogeneous,  and  we  included  new  variables  about  subject  expectations  (block  1).  We 
ordered the variables into three main categories.  



























































FREE‐0 1 2 3
FREE‐4
SHARING‐0 1 2 3
SHARING‐4














Remember  that  our  sessions  were  organized  in  line  with  a  stratified  sample  from  the 
populations of different cities and that our subjects received information about their session 















      ALL        FREE-RIDING   SHARING   EXACT  
                 
   Free  Sharing  Exact     Female  Male  Female  Male  Female  Male 
                 
BLOCK 1                               
e(money)  -0.000***  0.000*** -0.000*  -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***  -0.000*  -0.000
   [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]     [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]
                 
BLOCK 2                               
female  0.117*  -0.222***  0.202***           
  [0.066]  [0.063]  [0.062]            
white  0.174** -0.047 -0.105  0.174*  0.174  0.000  -0.071  -0.167*  -0.045
  [0.074] [0.073]  [0.070]   [0.098] [0.112] [0.099] [0.108]  [0.093]  [0.105]
black 0.176  -0.182  0.102    0.314  0.051  -0.055  -0.302 -0.189  0.344 
  [0.197] [0.184]  [0.171]   [0.267] [0.307] [0.285] [0.249]  [0.241]  [0.246]
indig  0.147 -0.138  -0.086    0.347 -0.008 -0.326 0.023  -0.071  -0.032
  [0.180] [0.188]  [0.218]   [0.245] [0.259] [0.215] [0.327]  [0.288]  [0.336]
age -0.016  0.011  -0.008    -0.012  -0.022  -0.003  0.029  0.011 -0.028
  [0.013] [0.012]  [0.012]   [0.018] [0.019] [0.016] [0.019]  [0.017]  [0.019]
age2  0.000  -0.000  0.000    0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000  -0.000  0.000 
  [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000]   [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]
educ -0.039***  0.023**  0.011    -0.037*** -0.037**  0.015  0.026*  0.020*  -0.002
   [0.010]  [0.009]  [0.009]     [0.014]  [0.016]  [0.013]  [0.015]  [0.012]  [0.015]
                 
BLOCK 3                               
married -0.061  0.041  -0.003    -0.105  -0.094  0.041  0.146  0.020 -0.097
  [0.081] [0.077]  [0.078]   [0.110] [0.136] [0.104] [0.130]  [0.110]  [0.129]
single -0.065  0.020  0.026    -0.169  0.135  0.137  -0.195  -0.010 0.108 
  [0.086] [0.082]  [0.081]   [0.114] [0.141] [0.108] [0.136]  [0.104]  [0.137]
wealth -0.048**  0.039**  -0.015    -0.043  -0.065**  0.035  0.052*  -0.014 -0.019
  [0.020] [0.019]  [0.018]   [0.026] [0.031] [0.025] [0.029]  [0.024]  [0.027]
excluded -0.009  -0.026  0.054    -0.059  0.060  0.018  -0.082  0.036 0.086 
  [0.072] [0.071]  [0.071]   [0.092] [0.119] [0.090] [0.120]  [0.089]  [0.119]
chief 0.090  -0.061  -0.023   -0.010  0.334**  -0.021 -0.299** 0.010 0.061 
   [0.074]  [0.069]  [0.070]     [0.106]  [0.133]  [0.099]  [0.125]  [0.104]  [0.122]
                 
N 1549  1549  1549     850  699  850  699  850  699 
Pseudo  R2  0.07 0.04  0.01      0.09 0.06 0.05 0.05  0.01  0.01 

































































  Education enhances pro‐social behavior   16
  Responsibility makes males less generous 
3.2. Reciprocal Behavior 
In  the  second  part  of  our  analysis  we  focused  on  the  amount  of  money  type‐2  players 
returned,  taking  into account the  amounts they received.  Instead of exploring  “types”  we 
directly explore the determinants of reciprocal behavior in each scenario: when player 1 sent 
the min (0%), the max (100%) and intermediate cases (25%, 50% and 75%). 










































We  consider  that  education  makes  people  aware  of  selfish  behavior,  and  it  would  be 
consistent to suppose that better‐educated subjects are unwilling to pass money to type‐1 
players who previously passed zero. We found this negative effect for both women and men. 
Alternatively  we  might  take  the  view  that  education  increases  selfishness,  but  when  we 









  MONEY RECEIVED BY PLAYER 2 
        
   Min: 0%  25%x3  50%x3  75%x3   Max:100%x3 
       
BLOCK 1                
e(money)  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 
    [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] 
        
BLOCK  2        
female 0.005  -0.085 -0.160***  -0.185***  -0.122** 
  [0.064] [0.059] [0.057] [0.056]  [0.057] 
white -0.072  -0.066  -0.120* -0.134**  -0.117* 
  [0.071] [0.067] [0.066] [0.065]  [0.065] 
black 0.083  -0.278  -0.167  -0.237  -0.189 
  [0.210] [0.209] [0.211] [0.152]  [0.186] 
indig -0.318*  -0.124  -0.073  -0.030  -0.291* 
  [0.192] [0.197] [0.190] [0.192]  [0.174] 
age 0.023*  0.023*  0.011  0.019*  0.017 
  [0.013] [0.012] [0.011] [0.011]  [0.012] 
age2  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000  -0.000 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] 
educ -0.049***  -0.000  0.013 0.025*** 0.026*** 
    [0.010] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009]  [0.009] 
        
BLOCK  3        
married  0.077 0.016 0.084 0.040  0.060 
  [0.077] [0.074] [0.072] [0.072]  [0.070] 
single -0.015  -0.002  0.045  0.048  0.099 
  [0.083] [0.078] [0.078] [0.077]  [0.077] 
wealth 0.015  -0.008  0.046**  0.042**  0.050*** 
  [0.020] [0.019] [0.019] [0.018]  [0.018] 
excluded -0.172**  0.014  0.025  -0.071  -0.041 
  [0.074] [0.069] [0.068] [0.065]  [0.066] 
chief 0.006  -0.083  -0.106  -0.100  -0.035 
    [0.074] [0.067] [0.066] [0.066]  [0.065] 
        
Observations  1548 1549 1548 1548  1548 












   Money Received by Player 2 
  Min: 0%  Between: 50%x3  Max: 100%x3 
         
    Female Male Female Male Female  Male 
         
BLOCK 1                   
e(money) 0.000***  0.000***  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 
    [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] 
         
BLOCK  2         
white  -0.111 -0.016 -0.092 -0.152 -0.053 -0.176* 
  [0.100] [0.104] [0.091] [0.097] [0.090]  [0.094] 
black  0.175 -0.055 -0.039 -0.349 -0.180  -0.254 
  [0.292] [0.313] [0.339] [0.266] [0.295]  [0.243] 
indig -0.490*  -0.127  -0.231  0.080  -0.443** -0.117 
  [0.272] [0.252] [0.244] [0.288] [0.226]  [0.269] 
age 0.025  0.024  -0.006  0.033*  0.010  0.024 
  [0.019] [0.019] [0.016] [0.017] [0.017]  [0.017] 
age2 -0.000  -0.000  0.000  -0.000*  -0.000  -0.000 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] 
educ -0.050*** -0.049*** 0.006  0.018  0.023*  0.028** 
  [0.013] [0.015] [0.012] [0.014] [0.012]  [0.013] 
         
BLOCK  3         
married  0.110 0.053 0.158 0.086 0.081  0.119 
  [0.111] [0.123] [0.099] [0.117] [0.097]  [0.114] 
single 0.163  -0.266** 0.240** -0.299** 0.193*  -0.090 
  [0.111] [0.130] [0.104] [0.125] [0.103]  [0.122] 
earnings 0.032  -0.001  0.056**  0.043  0.067*** 0.034 
  [0.026] [0.030] [0.025] [0.029] [0.024]  [0.028] 
excluded -0.198**  -0.145  0.058  0.002  -0.039  -0.033 
  [0.095] [0.123] [0.085] [0.113] [0.085]  [0.106] 
chief  -0.004 -0.072 -0.058 -0.374*** 0.033 -0.237** 
    [0.115] [0.120] [0.097] [0.112] [0.096]  [0.113] 
         
N 849  699  849  699  849  699 
Pseudo  R2  0.10 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.05  0.04 






































ourselves  why  previous  papers  reported  quite  different  results.  Basically  there  are  three 
possibilities:  1)  Latin‐American  people  are  different;  2)  previous  papers  were  based  on 
datasets that were too small; 3) Women are more generous in the lab but not in the field. 


























































  Free [%] Sharing [%] Exact [%] 
            
Significant cases  24   32   29  
Female>0 21  [8.4]  4  [1.6]  20  [8.0] 
Female<0 3  [1.2]  28  [11.2] 9  [3.6] 
Non‐significant cases  226  [90.4]  218  [87.2] 221  [88.4] 






































1)  The  role  of  beliefs  in  reciprocal  behavior.  We  consistently  found  that  optimism  is 
positively  correlated  to  sharing  and  negatively  to  free‐riding.  Therefore  optimism 
enhances reciprocity. 




























This  contrasts  with  previous  lab  dictator  game  experiments  (...)  that 
demonstrated that female dictators are more generous than male dictators. 
Young  female  students  in  Northern  universities,  however,  can  hardly  be 





typical  university  students.  Our  main  conclusion  is  that  gender  does  not  appear  to  be 
significant. In addition, we made recursive repetitions of the analysis using random draws and 



















because  of  data  limitation  (sample  size).  Obviously  other  cultural  differences,  for  instance 
differences  in  money  managing
21,  might  also  cause  a  gender  bias.  For  example,  our  data 
showed that marital status, if it matters, affects women in the opposite direction that it affects 






























































para  medir  capital  social  y  acción  colectiva  en  seis  ciudades  latinoamericanas”.  
Mimeo. Universidad de Los Andes, Bogotá. 







  J.  C.  Cox.  2002.  “Trust,  Reciprocity,  and  Other‐Regarding  Preferences:  Groups  vs. 
Individuals  and  Males  vs.  Females,”  in  Rami  Zwick  and  Amnon  Rapoport  (eds.) 
Experimental Business Research: 331‐ 350 Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
  J.  C.  Cox  and  C.  A.  Deck.  2006.  "When  Are  Women  More  Generous  than  Men?,” 
Economic Inquiry 44: 587‐598. 


























  A. Leon‐Mejia  and L. Miller. 2007. “The Devil is in the Details ‐ Sex Differences in 
Simple Bargaining Games,” Jena Economic Research Papers 2007‐069. 










        
   Free  Sharing  Exact  0x3  6,000x3  12,000x3 
        
BLOCK 1                   
e(money) -0.000***  0.000***  -0.000 0.000***  0.000*** 0.000*** 
    [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
        
B L O C K   2         
female 0.026  -0.235**  0.319***  0.006  -0.167*  -0.049 
  [0.110] [0.098] [0.100] [0.101] [0.088] [0.087] 
white 0.309**  -0.193*  0.014  -0.045  -0.228**  -0.213** 
  [0.125] [0.116] [0.110] [0.121] [0.105] [0.105] 
black  -0.557 0.678  -0.378  -0.211 0.392 0.171 
  [0.600] [0.563] [0.621] [0.406] [0.497] [0.226] 
indig  0.340 -0.625** 0.362 -1.174**  -0.696**  -0.603** 
  [0.485] [0.262] [0.354] [0.598] [0.313] [0.244] 
age -0.023  -0.001  0.015  0.059**  0.012  0.017 
  [0.026] [0.022] [0.023] [0.024] [0.021] [0.021] 
age2 0.000  0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
educ 13-22  0.008  -0.002  -0.007  -0.056*  -0.001  -0.003 
  [0.026] [0.026] [0.025] [0.029] [0.023] [0.023] 
        
B L O C K   3         
married  0.038 0.082  -0.120  0.026 0.095 -0.026 
  [0.145] [0.141] [0.137] [0.132] [0.126] [0.123] 
single  -0.219 0.189  -0.008  0.131 0.111 0.135 
  [0.158] [0.137] [0.140] [0.143] [0.126] [0.124] 
wealth -0.040  0.046  -0.039  0.037  0.073**  0.093*** 
  [0.036] [0.033] [0.031] [0.036] [0.030] [0.030] 
excluded  0.060 -0.045 0.112 -0.045 0.167 -0.045 
  [0.138] [0.134] [0.126] [0.142] [0.123] [0.119] 
chief  -0.032 0.122  -0.153  -0.059 -0.108 0.092 
    [0.129] [0.113] [0.119] [0.122] [0.107] [0.108] 
        
N  625 625  625 624 624 624 
Pseudo  R2  0.05 0.04  0.02 0.08 0.05 0.04 




        
   Free  Sharing  Exact  0x3  6,000x3  12,000x3 
        
BLOCK 1                   
e(money) -0.000***  0.000***  -0.000**  0.000***  0.000***  0.000*** 
    [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
        
BLOCK  2        
Female  0.103 -0.098 0.048 0.118 0.061 -0.058 
  [0.123] [0.126] [0.118] [0.127] [0.114] [0.107] 
White  0.237* -0.015 -0.250* 0.119 -0.280**  -0.257** 
  [0.139] [0.140] [0.138] [0.146] [0.127] [0.122] 
Black  -0.114 0.339 -0.368 0.368 0.037 0.071 
  [0.489] [0.346] [0.281] [0.428] [0.391] [0.404] 
Indig -0.095  -0.491  0.458  -0.863** -0.412*  -0.337* 
  [0.520] [0.491] [0.494] [0.421] [0.236] [0.191] 
17<Age<25 -0.540  -0.638  1.607*** -1.349**  -0.142  0.083 
  [0.559] [0.576] [0.550] [0.601] [0.533] [0.521] 
age2 0.013  0.015  -0.038*** 0.033**  0.004  -0.002 
  [0.014] [0.014] [0.013] [0.015] [0.013] [0.013] 
educ  -0.058**  0.078*** -0.038 -0.086*** 0.030  0.053** 
  [0.029] [0.029] [0.031] [0.032] [0.027] [0.025] 
        
BLOCK  3        
married -0.184  -0.353  0.877**  0.489  0.294  -0.180 
  [0.371] [0.285] [0.344] [0.379] [0.340] [0.385] 
single  -0.006 -0.143 0.070 -0.163 0.038 -0.101 
  [0.169] [0.199] [0.195] [0.191] [0.180] [0.166] 
wealth  -0.081* 0.107** -0.069*  0.001  0.089**  0.112*** 
  [0.043] [0.043] [0.039] [0.045] [0.041] [0.037] 
excluded  0.114 -0.183 0.159  -0.302*  -0.191 -0.103 
  [0.149] [0.143] [0.145] [0.182] [0.143] [0.138] 
chief  -0.220 0.011 0.009 0.146 0.038 0.161 
    [0.242] [0.197] [0.177] [0.282] [0.185] [0.196] 
        
N  374 374 374 374 374 374 
Pseudo  R2  0.06 0.06 0.03 0.10 0.06 0.05 
[Robust standard errors]; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
 